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This study identifies possible human errors that can result in 
fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at the 
XYZ marine petroleum terminal. Risk control solutions are developed to 
minimize the human errors. 
Between the oil fields of the world and the users of derivative 
products, independent terminals like XYZ perform vital connecting 
services. Independent storage terminals are those which are not owned by 
the clients they serve and do not own any of the products they handle. 
  
XYZ’s clients include private and state oil companies, refiners, 
petrochemical companies, and traders in petroleum products and 
chemicals. Located in Houston, Texas, the XYZ terminal handles more 
than 3.6 million tons of oil products annually (XYZ terminal, 2000). 
Similarly, oil tankers play a vital role on the transportation of the 
major part of the world's huge production of crude oil. Supertankers 
carrying 300,000 tons or more of crude are in service, and oil accounts for 
half the annual tonnage of all sea cargoes. (International Labour Office 
Geneva, 1983).  
In general, the bulk carriage of crude oil presents special problems, 
such as the surging and expansion of the liquid cargo. In addition, the 
hazardous nature of crude oil has to be taken into account; flammable 
vapors have to be dispersed safely, especially during fast 
loading/unloading of cargo at the marine terminals. To meet some of these 
requirements, tankers are equipped with inert gas systems and vapor 
control systems to minimize fire and explosion risks (Carlebur, 1995).  
Despite the advances that have been made in tanker design, fire 
prevention systems, and firefighting technology, shipboard fires remain a 
very real threat (Mediola & Achutegui, 2000). The enormous amount of 
hazardous and flammable materials transported by water raises concerns 
not only for the safety of the vessel’s crew, but also for the protection of 
the surrounding environment against catastrophic spills and pollution 
(Williams, 1999). Human errors have been determined as one of the 
biggest causes of these accidental losses. At least 80% of the 911 tanker 
  
accidents that occurred between 1974 and 1996 were caused by human 
error (Marcus & Brown, 1997).  
Accident data gathered worldwide has verified that human errors 
were the cause of 64% of the accidents during loading/unloading 
operations (Hart, 1994). According to the International Tanker Owner 
Pollution Federation Ltd (2000), the highest likelihood of occurrence for 
fires/explosions happens during operational activities at the 
loading/unloading jetty. 
The Objectives of this study is to (1) identify possible types of 
human errors that can result in fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo 
loading/unloading operations and (2) provide risk control solutions to the 
identified problems at the XYZ petroleum marine terminal. 
 A literature review was conducted in order to compiles available 
information for the better understanding of possible human errors that 
result in fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading 
operations. Twenty questionnaire-surveys were sent to the terminal and 
ten of them returned with answers. Consequently, a secondary study was 
needed in order to support and verify the results previously mentioned 
above. This section summarizes some of the most relevant worldwide 
human-error experiences that have resulted in fires/explosions during 
tankers´cargo loading/unloading operations within the petroleum industry. 
Finally, the research brings conclusions and recommendation to be used 
in future operations at the XYZ terminal.  
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Chapter I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Purpose of the study 
This study identifies possible human errors that can result in 
fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at 
the XYZ marine petroleum terminal. Risk control solutions are 
developed to minimize the human errors. 
Research Goals 
1) Identify possible types of human errors that can result in 
fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading 
operations. 
2) Provide risk control solutions to the identified problems.  
Background 
Every year lives are lost and millions of dollars' worth of damage 
is caused through fires in ships (see table 1). Human error is by far the 
most common cause of fires. It is often a single careless act that 
endangers the lives of all the crew. (The International Tanker Owners 
Pollution Federation Limited, 1999).  
Despite the advances that have been made in tanker design, fire 
prevention systems, and firefighting technology, shipboard fires remain 
a very real threat. Accidents involving fires/explosions rank second in 
maritime casualties. A survey of total loss accidents in 1500 oil tankers 
over a period of 25 years, 1971 to 1996, showed that these can be 
  
arranged in the following order: stranding, fire, water-leaks, gales and 
collisions (Mediola & Achutegui, 2000). The enormous amount of 
hazardous and flammable materials transported by water raises 
concerns not only for the safety of the vessel’s crew, but also for the 
protection of the surrounding environment against catastrophic spills 
and pollution (Williams, 1999). 
Table 1, Fires/explosion some related costs 
Losses & Damages Incurred Costs 
Tanker damages Depends on the severity of the accident 
(equipment, vessel structure integrity and 
areas affects). Fires/explosions are well 
known as the largest vessel damage costs 
(Tobit estimation, 1988) 
Environmental liability 
As high as $1,200 per vessel ton 
or $10 Million for vessels over 3000 gross 
tons; whichever is greater (Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA-1990)). 
Oil-spill: 
Environment clean-up 
$1,500 – $38,000 per ton of spilled product 
(National Research Council, 1991) 
Oil-spill: 
Crude oil cost 
$30.48/ barrel (OPEC) 
$31.75/barrel (Brent) 
$33.97/barrel (West Texas) 
(Source: Oil World Market, Nov 10/2000) 
Terminal: 
Service demurrage 
$20,000/day 
Tanker capacity: 80,000 deadweight tons 
(Source: XYZ terminal) 
Terminal: 
Business interruption 
$80,000/tanker 
Tanker capacity: 80,000 deadweight tons 
(Source: XYZ terminal) 
 
At least 80% of the 911 tanker accidents that occurred between 
1974 and 1996 were caused by human error (Marcus & Brown, 1997). 
  
Similarly, accident data gathered worldwide has verified that human 
errors were the cause of 64% of the accidents during loading/unloading 
operations (Hart, 1994). In addition, the International Tanker Owner 
Pollution Federation Ltd (2000) determined that the highest likelihood 
of occurrence for fires/explosions happens during operational activities 
at the loading/unloading jetty. Thus, 1) A source of ignition generated 
by friction in the flanged joint interface of the tanker manifold/terminal 
piping system when hook up operation, 2) a flammable vapor leakage 
because of poor sealing in the flanged joint interface of the tanker 
manifold/terminal piping system during loading/unloading operation, 3) 
a seaman careless using cigarette lighters in no smoking areas, 4) 
preparedness, and lack of experience to set adequately the inert gas 
system for vapor control and fire prevention, 5) and poor quality in 
maintenance work because of operators no following appropriated  
company procedures and fire safety precautions, are some of the 
typical cause of losses directly related to tanker-terminal operator 
errors (XYZ terminal, 2000) 
The existing petroleum transportation industry operates in a very 
strongly regulated business environment. Companies are liable to pay 
for worker’s compensation, property damages, and the clean up of the 
environment. In addition, indirect costs, such as terminal-tanker 
loading/unloading demurrage, terminal-refinery crude/product delivery 
demurrage, and accident investigation service by the U.S National 
  
Coast Guard, among others, enlarge the total operational costs (see 
table 1).  
Definitively, failures of this nature aren’t acceptable in today’s 
aggressive and competitive oil transportation market. To prevent these 
losses, risk control solutions developed in this research paper will 
contribute to minimizing these additional costs.  
Limitations of the Study 
1. This study is limited to one petroleum terminal operator located in 
Texas, The United States of America.  
2. Interviews and questionnaire feedback are based on the 
performance and experience of the XYZ petroleum terminal 
operator located in Texas, U.S.A. 
Definition of Terms 
Behavior questions: 
Questions that ask about behavior and/or actions. Examples 
are: characteristics of people, things people have done, or things that 
have happened to them that are, in principle, verifiable by an external 
observer. Knowledge questions are considered behavior questions. 
Human error: 
It is the failure of a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities. 
 
 
  
Mistakes: 
A mistake is a planning failure, where actions go as planned but 
the plan was faulted. These are errors of judgment, inference, and the 
like, that result in an incorrect intention, incorrect choice of criterion, or 
incorrect value judgments. 
Moral Hazard: 
Hazard arising from personal, as distinguished from physical, 
characteristics, such as the habits, methods of management, financial 
standing, mental condition, or lack of integrity of an insured who may 
intentionally cause a loss (Anderson & Talley, 1995). 
Safety: 
The condition of being free from exposure to a hazardous 
situation, injury, illness, or loss. It is based on knowledge and skills of 
avoiding accidents (Tarrants, 1970).   
Stranding: 
Vessel tanker grounding or hitting the sea bottom 
Risk: 
Hazard/condition/behavior that may increase the likelihood of 
frequency and/or severity of accidental loss. 
Risk Control: 
All methods of reducing the frequency and/or severity of losses, 
including exposure avoidance, separation, combination, loss 
prevention, loss reduction, segregation of exposure units and non-
  
insurance transfer of risk. The term focused on economic measures, 
broad areas of risk, and is management oriented yet employee 
inclusive. 
Tanker: 
A ship designed to carry liquid petroleum cargo in bulk, including 
a combination carrier when being used for this purpose. 
Terminal: 
A place where tankers are berthed or moored for the purpose of 
loading or discharging petroleum cargo. 
Terminal service – demurrage:  
A charge by a carrier for the detention of equipment and cargo 
beyond the free period which is allowed for loading and/or unloading. 
Other Definitions 
Anti-static additive: 
A substance added to a petroleum product to raise its electrical 
conductivity to prevent accumulation of static electricity. 
Flame screen: 
A fitted device incorporating one or more corrosive resistant 
woven wire fabrics of very small mesh used for preventing sparks from 
entering a tank or vent opening or, for a short time, preventing the 
passage of flame. 
 
 
  
Gas free: 
A tank compartment or container is gas free when sufficient 
fresh air has been introduced into it to lower the level of any flammable, 
toxic, or inert gas; it is required for a specific purpose, e.g. hot work, 
entry, etc. 
Hazardous area: 
Areas on shore, which for the purpose of the installation and use 
of electrical equipment, are regarded as dangerous. 
Hot work: 
Work involving sources of ignition or temperatures sufficiently 
high to cause the ignition of a flammable vapor mixture. It is commonly 
referred to cutting and welding operations 
Inert conditions: 
A condition in which the oxygen content throughout the 
atmosphere of a tank has been reduced to 8% or less by volume by 
addition of the inert gas. 
Insulating flange: 
A flanged joint incorporating an insulating gasket, sleeves and 
washers, to prevent electrical continuity between pipelines, hose string 
or loading arms. 
Purging: 
The introduction of inert gas into a tank already in the inert 
condition with the object of further reducing the existing oxygen 
  
content, and/or reducing the existing hydrocarbon gas content to a 
level below which combustion cannot be supported if air is 
subsequently introduced into the tank. 
Static electricity: 
The electricity produced on dissimilar materials through physical 
contact and separation. 
Topping up: 
The introduction of inert gas into a tank that is already in the 
inert condition, with the object of raising the tank pressure to prevent 
any ingress of air.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
This chapter compiles available information for the better 
understanding of possible human errors that result in fires/explosions 
during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at the marine 
petroleum terminal. The review studies the variable human errors to 
better appreciate and understand possible direct/indirect relationships 
associated with fire/explosion losses within the interface: oil tanker-
marine terminal.  
Oil Transportation and Tankers 
The major part of the world's huge production of crude oil has to 
be carried to overseas refineries by tankships. The prototype of the 
modern tanker was built in 1886 to carry 2300 tons of oil. Today, 
supertankers carrying 300,000 tons or more of crude are in service, 
and oil accounts for half the annual tonnage of all sea cargoes. The 
actual carrying capacity of world tankers exceeds 180 million tons 
(International Labour Office Geneva, 1983).  
In general, crude oil is carried in large tankers, and smaller 
vessels are used to carry the refined petroleum products. The bulk 
carriage of crude oil presents special problems, such as the surging 
and expansion of the liquid cargo. Moreover, the hazardous nature of 
crude oil has to be taken into account; flammable vapors have to be 
dispersed safely, especially during fast loading of cargo. To meet some 
  
of these requirements, tankers are built with engines aft and the cargo 
space divided into a number of separate tanks. The cargo areas can be 
entered through small hatches, which are of limited sizes and 
quantities to preserve the vessel’s structural integrity. Cargo pumps are 
housed in individual pumprooms, and forced ventilation is provided to 
purge compartments of hazardous gases and vapors. Some tanks are 
also equipped with inert gas systems to minimize fire and explosion 
risks in cargo spaces (Carlebur, 1995).  
Loading/Unloading Operations  
Based on description provided by Hart (1994), a transfer 
operation at the marine terminal can be described as a seven-step 
process (figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step #1 
 
Docking 
Step #2 
 
Hook up 
Step #3 
 
Start-up 
Step #4 
Steady 
transfer 
Step #5 
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Step #6 
 
Disconnect 
Step #7 
 
Departure 
Figure 1.
  
Loading Operations 
Here, oil products are pumped from the terminal storage 
area to the tanker being loaded. The steps are: 
1. Docking: It is the process of approaching and securing a ship 
to a terminal in a safe fashion. 
2. Hook up: It is the commencement of the transfer operation. 
Cargo types, flow rates, communication signals, stoppages, 
and emergency procedures are some of the activities 
covered in a conference conducted between authorized 
representatives of the ship and terminal personnel. In 
addition, a preliminary inspection is pursued in order to 
ensure safe conditions onboard of the tanker vessel. “It looks 
for specific conditions that have proved to be the most critical 
from the past experience” (International Safety Guide for Oil 
Tankers and Terminals, 1988). Once the understanding is 
reached and the accompanying declaration of inspection is 
signed, the transfer of the tanker's cargo may begin with the 
hook-up of hoses and loading arms.  
3. Start up: It is the initial stage in the transfer process of fluid 
pumping. The initial flow rate should always be low. All 
valves in a dedicated pipeline must be opened during 
pumping. The valve closest to the source tank is the last one 
opened. When the pumps are turned on, the flow rate is set 
  
to the minimum. At this point checks are conducted to ensure 
that the flow is indeed going to the correct place and no 
leaks are occurring in any of the pipes or connections. Once 
the flow has been proved to have no leaks, orders are given 
to increase the flow to the maximum agreed upon. 
4. Steady transfer: It starts with a slow increase of the flow rate 
to the maximum flow, about 400 bbl/min, which is continued 
for the duration of the transfer. It takes about 10 hours and 
involves hourly checking for leaks, tank soundings, flow 
volume calculations, and general proper operation of the 
entire system.  In addition, the inert gas system and vapor 
control system must be turned on in order to keep flammable 
vapors below 8% oxygen inside of the tank areas. 
5. Topping off: It is the continuous decreasing of flow rate that 
starts before the tanks become full. Topping off occurs 
usually in the last 1.5 hours of the transfer and the operation 
is similar to that of start-up, except opposite. In general, the 
liquid level is at least 2 feet below the deck level at the 
expansion trunk-- that means 98% of the tank capacity.  
6. Disconnect: It involves removing the bolts connecting the 
shore hoses and/or loading arms to the ship manifolds, 
purging the hoses with air or inert gas to clear it of excess 
product, and capping both the hoses and manifolds. 
  
7. Departure: It’s when the ship has completed all the legal and 
technical aspects of the business, so it is ready to leave the 
terminal. 
Unloading Operations 
Basically, unloading operations follow the same steps as 
loading operations. However, products are pumped from the 
tanker vessel to the terminal and the venting system must allow 
air to pass into the unloading tanks in order to preserve the 
structural integrity of the ship.  
Oil Tanker’s Existing Technologies and Risk Control Guidelines  
Through the years, the oil transportation industry has developed 
effective technologies and applicable safety guides for the operation of 
oil tankers and terminals. The existing technologies are based on 
hazard control principles and exposure minimization.  
These systems are: 
1. The inert gas system; 
2. The venting system and; 
3. Anti-static additive for static electricity controls in cargo products 
1. The Inert Gas System.  
When flammable gases are present in areas where they 
can develop into a flammable or explosive hazard, the safest 
way to remove them is to purge the area with inert gases (Cote 
& Linville, 1990). One of the greatest advances in tanker 
  
operations over the last 20 years seems to be the introduction, 
on an increasing scale, of inert gas systems. The United States 
Coast Guard (USCG), in concert with the Chemical 
Transportation Advisory Committee (CTAC), have developed 
and implemented regulations, under title 46 CFR, part 39, 
governing the design and operation of these systems. Today, 
numerous tank vessels have been modified for vapor control 
operations as required, and are conducting closed operations 
at loading facilities. 
It is known that petroleum gives off flammable vapors, 
and that the actual amount of these depends on the particular 
grade of petroleum being handled. However, petroleum vapors 
are only flammable when certain air/vapor mixtures are 
achieved (Rutherford, 1980). The limits of the flammable range 
of petroleum vapors have been determined to be from 1% to 
10% per volume of the atmosphere at the cargo area 
(International Chamber of Shipping Oil Companies - 
International Marine Forum International Association of Ports 
and Harbors, 1988). Nevertheless, there are many times during 
operations, especially loading/unloading operations, when the 
tank atmosphere can fall within the flammable range; it is 
therefore necessary to take special precautions to avoid the 
possibility of fire/explosion.  
  
It must be remembered that a fire/explosion situation can 
only occur if there is enough oxygen in the atmosphere to 
support the combustion. In general, ordinary air contains about 
21% oxygen and is capable of supporting combustion. It is a 
fact that if the oxygen level were reduced to below 11%, there 
would be insufficient oxygen to start the flame, even when a 
possible sparking source exists (Compressed Gas Association, 
1987). The object of the inert system is to reduce the oxygen 
level in the tank atmosphere by replacing it with some other gas 
such as carbon dioxide or nitrogen. This is usually achieved by 
using a fixed piping arrangement to blow the inert gas into the 
cargo tank (International Chamber of Shipping Oil Companies - 
International Marine Forum International Association of Ports 
and Harbors, 1988).  Finally, this piping system is directly 
related to a venting system. 
2. The Venting System.  
Whenever a liquid is introduced into a closed tank, it is 
necessary to ensure that air is adequately vented in order to 
avoid a possible over-pressure that can distort the tank due to 
liquid entering it. Similarly, when liquid is taken from a closed 
tank by a pump, without air being allowed to enter, the tank will 
be distorted because the pressure outside will exceed the 
pressure inside (Mechanical Engineers' Handbook, 1998). This 
  
phenomenon clearly applies to tanker operations. However, the 
issue is not under control just by ensuring a clear airway to and 
from the tank (Rutherford, 1980). By the nature of the cargo, 
flammable vapors may also be vented from the tanks. The 
venting arrangements are gas lines that lead from each tank to 
a common main line running the full length of the ship. The 
excess vapors from the common line are carried up a vertical 
structure, a 30-40ft riser, above the main deck level to ensure 
their effective dispersion before they can fall to the deck level. 
In addition, a special pressure vacuum valve installed at the 
foot of the riser retains vapors in the tank venting system until 
the pressure rises to approximately 0.01 kg/cm2, in order to 
minimize the continuos vapor release.  When this pressure is 
reached, the valve lifts and releases vapors to the atmosphere; 
when the pressure drops below this figure, the valve closes. 
Therefore, a vacuum effect will happen if oil cargo contracts 
because of temperature changes. When the valve of the 
vacuum side reaches 0.002 kg/cm2, this will open and allow air 
to enter the tank, thus preventing any distortions of the cargo 
tank bulkheads. When cargo is being loaded, the vacuum valve 
would cause an undesired obstruction to the passage of the 
large volume of vapor pushed from the tank by the incoming 
cargo. In order to overcome this problem, it is usual to fit a 
  
“manually operated bypass” around the vacuum valve, allowing 
a clear passage for the gas to pass directly to the mast riser. 
Moreover, a flame arrestor is usually installed at the outlet in 
the riser (at the top end), or sometimes next to the vacuum 
valve (at the riser base). Thus, measures are taken in order to 
block a flame passing through into the common main vapor 
pipeline and possibly the cargo tanks. Finally, an independent 
tank vent system can also exist. The principles are basically the 
same (Compressed Gas Association, 1987). 
3.  Anti-static additives for static electricity control in cargo products. 
Conductivity is another important concern when the cargo 
being handled is an accumulator of static electricity. Oils that 
have sufficient conductivity to prevent an accumulation of static 
electricity may be loaded without anti-static precautions, 
regardless of tank flammability. These are: crude oil, residual 
fuel oils, black diesel oils, and asphalt (bitumen). In contrast, 
gasolines, kerosenes, white spirits, jet fuels, naphthas, heating 
oils, heavy gas oils, diesel, and lubricating oils; they are 
accumulators of static electricity because of their low 
conductivity under certain conditions. Thus, they will require 
special precautions such as the usage of anti-static additive 
and the regulation of the flow rate during loading/unloading 
operations (Vinnem & Skjelldal, 1991).  
  
Moreover, procedures enforce the aim of these existing 
technologies. The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and 
Terminal was the most valuable documentation found during this 
literature review since it is what every one applies in the field. “It is the 
integration of the vast storehouse of worldwide experience in many 
varied disciplines associated with the tanker/terminal functions” 
(Institute of Petroleum, 1981). Its information is frequently up-graded 
using recommendations generated during annual conferences and 
symposiums around the world. 
 
Fires/Explosions during Tankers’ Cargo Loading/Unloading 
Operations in Marine Petroleum Terminals 
Every year lives are lost and millions of dollars' worth of damage 
is caused through fires in ships (see table 1, p. 2). Human error is by 
far the most common cause of fires. It is often a single careless act that 
endangers the lives of the entire crew. (The International Tanker 
Owners Pollution Federation Limited, 1999). Is there any place where 
failure or malfunction could bring disaster onboard tankers? The 
danger spots are machinery rooms, accommodation, and cargo spaces 
(The Capt. Loannides’ Web Site, 2000). Every member of the ship’s 
crew and terminal operator has a part to play in preventing fires. For 
instance, take a look at oil tanker operations and some fire/explosion 
cases: 
  
• An oil product vessel carrier was on fire in the North Sea Area. 
Although the access hatches to the holds were gas-tight, they 
were opened at intervals to check the temperature of the cargo. 
The mast houses above were also clearly marked as "NO 
SMOKING" areas because of the danger of vapors lingering 
after each opening of the access hatch. While loading petroleum 
products in port, a seaman lit a cigarette lighter to see more 
clearly under a shelf in the mast house. There was a flash fire 
and the seaman and his mate were badly burned. Both were 
taken off the ship by helicopter and rushed to hospital for 
treatment (The Capt. Loannides’ Web Site, 2000). 
• On a very cold day in December, 1981, a collision on the Ohio 
River touched off a fire aboard a ship-tanker carrying 1,250,000 
gallons of gasoline.  The vessel superstructure hit the dock 
fender when arriving to the terminal.  Despite the significant 
increase in wind speed and the extensive current flow, the 
terminal leader and the tanker operator decided to continue with 
the arrival activities; these bad conditions, combined with the 
unfortunate decision of the terminal leader and the tanker 
operator, were the direct causes of the accident. After 25 
minutes of foam application, the fire was extinguished. However, 
the fire was reignited by hot carbon buildup falling from the 
interior roof into the gasoline below. Human error was 
  
determined as the cause of this accident. (The Capt. Loannides’ 
Web Site, 2000).  
• While unloading crude oil in the terminal, the engineer aboard 
the carrier was using oxy-acetylene equipment to carry out 
minor repairs in the Engine Room workshop when a fire broke 
out near the oxygen and acetylene bottles. Subsequent 
investigation revealed that it had started because of a leaking 
hose of the oxy-acetylene equipment (International Chamber of 
Shipping, 1986). 
• A ball of fire erupted in the engine room of the Australian tanker 
Helix when a flanged joint on a hydraulic system failed under 
pressure. The fire was the result of the failure of bolts securing a 
flange on a hydraulic pump. Later, investigations proved that 
these bolts were improperly adjusted, being out of the 
specification. The hydraulic pumps shut down automatically on 
loss of pressure, causing the fireball to be short-lived. Nobody 
was hurt and no pollution resulted. Moreover, in another part of 
the ship, personnel heard and felt a thump as the spray of 
leaking hydraulic oil ignited on the exhaust of a diesel engine 
driving the hydraulic pump. The damage was limited to light 
fittings, melted indicator and warning lights, and smoke damage 
(Australia’s Commonwealth Department of Transport and 
Regional Services, 1999). 
  
• On December 19, 1998, the Australian flag tanker Tasman was 
alongside at No.28 wharf in the port of Melbourne, where it was 
undergoing some maintenance, modification work and being 
surveyed, while oil-products were being unloaded at the port. An 
accident was caused by a vibration on the pipes because one of 
the maintenance operators left two Allen screws loose, allowing 
fuel to be sprayed into a hot-box before igniting on the exhaust 
pipes. The fire caused some damage to the No.1 generator, but 
the most significant damage was that sustained by electric 
cables in the cable trays beneath the deckhead. Since 
tanker/terminal maintenance operators did not follow 
procedures, the human error was determined as the cause of 
this accident (Australia’s Commonwealth Department of 
Transport and Regional Services, 1998).  
• On January 19, 1996, the U.S. tug Scandia had an engine room 
fire while towing the unmanned U.S. tank barge into the Point 
Judith Petroleum Terminal in Rhode Island during the arrival 
operations. All six crewmembers abandoned the Scandia amid 
10-foot waves and 25-knot winds. The crew was unsuccessful in 
its attempts to release the anchor of the barge, which ran 
aground and spilled 828,000 gallons of home heating oil, 
causing the largest pollution incident in Rhode Island's history. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the 
  
cause of fire damage aboard the tug Scandia, and the 
subsequent grounding of and pollution from the barge North 
Cape, was the inadequate maintenance and operations aboard 
the towing vessel, which permitted a fire of unknown origin to 
become catastrophic and eliminated any possibility of arresting 
the subsequent drift and grounding of the barge. Contributing to 
the accident were the lack of adequate U.S. Coast Guard and 
industry standards addressing towing vessel safety (U.S 
National Transportation Safety Board, 1996). 
• In Veracruz, Mexico, a tanker ship was being unloaded of its 
cargo of highly lethal and flammable polar solvent. Then, a 
container holding the same solvent was accidentally dropped 
inside the ship, setting off a fire. The hatches were closed and 
the ship's own CO2 firefighting system was used to extinguish 
the fire, as the ship was towed out of the harbor and anchored 
off the coast. Believing they had achieved successful 
extinguishments, the ship's officials ordered the hatches 
reopened, allowing oxygen into the hold. This created a 
tremendous explosion and reignited the fire (Tank Ship Fires 
and Study Cases, 1981). 
• In September 1990, a tanker was unloading gasoline at an oil 
company dock in Bay City, Michigan when an explosion sent 
flames and black smoke hurling over the Saginaw River. The fire 
  
aboard this tanker, which was carrying 1.5 million gallons of 
gasoline, is considered to be one of the largest tanker ship fires 
in marine history to be successfully extinguished. The causes of 
the explosion couldn’t be determined; however, U.S and 
Michigan authorities suspect that the lack of preparedness for 
the unloading operation led an operator to make an error while 
setting the inert gas system for vapor control and fire prevention 
(Tank Ship Fires and Study Cases, 1990). 
 
 In brief, all these losses were directly related to human errors 
while tanker-terminal operators were performing their job. Based on the 
provided data, five out of eight (62.5%) of fire/explosion accidental 
losses happened during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations in 
marine terminals. In addition, unloading operations seem to be the 
most critical in terms of accident frequency. They represent 50% of the 
accidents listed above, and are the result of non-compliance with 
existing risk control rules regarding “hot work permits” and “no smoking 
areas. 
Since accidents described in this section aren’t acceptable in 
today’s aggressive and competitive oil transportation market, the 
existing petroleum transportation industry has been challenged to 
invest in large financial and time efforts to prevent losses and to control 
risk associated with fires/explosions in tanker/terminal operations. 
  
 For instance, some efforts and results have been focused on: 
1. Process hazard analysis 
2. Training 
3. Fire/explosion risk control precautions 
4. Behavior based safety 
5. Tanker/barge inspection systems 
6. Hot work permits 
The following section describes these risk control practices  
 
Risk control practices for human error reduction during 
loading/unloading operations in marine petroleum terminals. 
 A Positive Experience in Citgo Petroleum & Co.  
According to Citgo Petroleum (1996),a “process hazard 
analysis” (P.H.A) for each activity that has the potential to 
generate fires/explosions is the core component of a process 
safety management procedure implemented in refineries, 
terminals and storage facilities belonging to the Energy 
Corporation. Its implementation has cut losses from 22% to 
15%.    
The process hazard analysis examines, but is not 
confined to:  
  
1. Human factors analysis of working conditions that may 
adversely impact the safety performance of CITGO 
personnel and potentially produce accident event 
sequences, especially during startup, maintenance 
operations, and upset/emergency conditions.  
2. The P.H.A is actually performed by a group of operators 
previously trained during the initial phase by individuals 
with expertise in engineering, process operations, and 
maintenance. Everyday activities are performed by 
teams, which at least have one person with experience 
and specific knowledge to the hazard or process under 
evaluation. 
Consequently, the program enforces: 
A detailed and effective communication of 
procedures, activities and hazards related to the 
ongoing operations. It is possible by the usage of 
“preliminary job analysis form”;  
The training programs for unit operators and 
supervisors;  
The training and certification programs for 
inspection personnel; 
  
The adequacy of training and equipment for 
emergency responders and firefighting personnel;  
Authority and responsibility of personnel to identify 
and correct hazardous conditions;  
Refresher and supplemental training sessions 
provided at least annually to ensure understanding 
and adherence to the current procedures for 
performing activities safely and reducing risk.  
A productivity issue at Kurnell Refinery and Marine Terminal. 
In Australia, the terminal company operator at Kurnell 
Refinery & Marine Terminal, included in its policy requirements 
the provision of improved signing systems on board clients’ 
barges and tankers, since having vessels parked in the dock for 
long periods of time became a productivity issue. The decision 
not only provided better controls on the required activities for 
loading/unloading products, but also delayed a construction 
project for the expansion of the existing terminal.  As result, 
vessels spend less time parked in the facility. Paper work and 
documentation were also reduced and the company manages a 
higher volume of products annually.  
  
Actions also assure the existence of  "NO SMOKING" 
signs posted on board vessel and dock-terminal surroundings, a 
monitoring program for perfect connections on combustible 
liquid and vapor control piping, and continuous operation 
inspections (CALTEX, 2000). 
A behavior based safety program 
It is a program focused almost entirely on modifying the 
behavior of workers in order to prevent accidental losses. The 
fundamental premise is that the overwhelming majority of losses 
are the result of human errors. Since 1991, Chevron & Co. has 
been implementing and reinforcing the program at its 
loading/unloading terminal facilities located in New Jersey and 
California.  The first step in the behavior-based program is 
usually listing critical worker behaviors. Next, inspectors 
(observers), are selected to periodically monitor the work 
activities of operators. The company was able to reduce losses 
by 20% and improve the quality of internal services. They train 
their employees using the “Dupont Safety Training and 
Observation Program,” improving operators’ compliance with the 
existing standards operational procedures. Keeping the safety 
awareness level high positively affects operators’ behavior 
(Chevron Marine Terminals, 2000).  Some important aspects of 
the program are: 
  
Two times a week, terminal management (general 
supervisors, safety manager, and facility manager) 
attends a morning meeting to review the previous days’ 
safety and productivity issues. General supervisors take 
the information back to their areas to share with their 
supervisors. 
 All operators attend monthly safety meetings. The 
safety team chooses the monthly topic. Safety tips are 
generated and posted in the monthly company bulletin. 
“Safety behavior at the facilities has progressed and is 
currently at the observation and empowerment levels. Workers 
use risk-free practices as a matter of habit” (Chevron Marine 
Terminals, 2000). 
The results enforce the fire/explosion error free 
expectations. Operators call each other to attend in precaution 
of possible risky actions and to avoid dangerous situations. 
Important fire/explosion precaution practices are listed below, 
table 2. 
  
Table 2, Important fire/explosion precautionary actions 
Rule Remark 
No Smoking • Strictly enforce NO SMOKING rules 
No Matches or Cigarette Lighters • Collect matches and cigarette lighters 
at the checkpoint before entering the 
facility. 
No Smoking Signs • Post NO SMOKING WITHIN 50 FEET 
signs where they can be seen. 
Flame-and Spark-Producing Equipment • Do not use open flames, heating 
stoves, electrical tools, or other such 
apparatus in petroleum storage areas, 
tankers, and dock areas. 
Explosion-Proof Equipment • Use only authorized tools, equipment, 
and clothing.  
• Use explosion proof lights and 
flashlights. 
Tools • Keep tools and equipment in safe and 
good working condition. 
Equipment Bonding and Grounding • Bond and ground pumps, tank 
vehicles, and storage tanks. 
Spills • Control spills with a proactive spill 
prevention system. Immediately clean 
up and report spills. 
• Treat the area as especially hazardous 
until vapors are gone. When vapors 
are gone, remove the spill. 
Leaks • Always inspect tank seams, joints, 
piping, valves, and pumps for leaks. 
• Repair leaks at once. 
• Replace defective hoses, gaskets, and 
faucets immediately. 
Inspections • Inspect equipment, safety devices, and 
work areas frequently to ensure risk-
free expectations and to correct 
hazards. 
Solvents • Use only authorized solvents for 
cleaning. 
Beware of unventilated spaces. • Becareful around unventilated or 
confined spaces. 
Consult with others when conducting 
ventilating and vapor-freeing operations. 
• Consult other area operations that 
could be sources of ignition. 
No handling of Products During Electrical 
Storms 
• Place fire extinguishers and other fire 
fighting equipment within easy reach 
but where it will be safe from fire. 
Hot work permits  • Gas free certificate must be issued. 
• Portable continuos gas detector must 
keep monitoring the atmosphere in the 
working area. 
• Work area must be clear of any 
combustible material. 
• Fire fighting equipment must be ready 
for immediate use. 
Source: Chevron Marine Terminals, 2000. 
Tankers/Barges Report Data Base for Inspection 
As a consequence of a number of tanker fire accidents in the late 
1970s, oil and chemical companies individually introduced ship-venting 
arrangements to assess vessels prior to chartering. Later, in the 1990s, 
the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) system called 
SIRE (Ship Inspection Report Programme), and the Chemical 
Distribution Institute (CDI) inspection report data-sharing scheme were 
developed. With these systems, which are worldwide, inspections are 
carried out and reports issued in a consistent format. The reports are 
held in a central database and can be accessed by system-scheme 
members who are considering chartering the vessel in question. The 
reports themselves do not pass or fail the vessels, but describe their 
physical condition and operational systems. It is then up to the individual 
charterer to decide whether the vessel conforms to the standards for the 
voyage and cargo in question. It represents a great advantage since the 
tanker world fleet is very heterogeneous in terms of size, design, age, 
instrumentation, and fire prevention/protection systems. Thus, terminal 
operator crews can get prepared prior to the loading/unloading 
operations on a specific vessel, reducing the probability of accidental 
losses because of human errors (Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum, 2000).  
  
Tanker/Barge Inspection System 
Moreover, in the early 1990s, concern also arose about the 
situation in the European petroleum industry following a series of 
incidents that had occurred with tankers and barges. These incidents 
coupled with an on-going catalogue of lesser events, which arose more 
through operator errors than mechanical deficiencies. In effect, oil and 
petrochemical companies employing tankers introduced a variety of 
tanker/barge inspection and assessment arrangements to minimize 
exposure to substandard operators. Recognizing the existing 
uncoordinated approach to tanker inspections and the advantages of 
adopting a scheme similar to the maritime SIRE and CDI systems; 
CONCAWE, the Oil Companies´ European organization for environment, 
health and safety,  was approached at the beginning of 1995 by several 
of its member companies and their associated petrochemical companies 
to host a series of meetings to enable the development of a European 
tanker/barge inspection scheme (Vinnem & Skjelldal, 1991). 
A Successful Hot Work Permit System 
Hot work permit systems have been implemented in the petroleum 
industry for a long time. Basically, it is the completion of a series of 
requirements before operators start performing the job. The hot work can 
  
be a part of any activity but is especially related to maintenance work.  It 
involves brazing, cutting, grinding, soldering, and thawing frozen pipes 
and equipment. The European Petroleum Loss Prevention Council (UK) 
found that 83 serious fires (those fires with damages exceeding 
$100,000 and/or resulting in fatality) were caused by hot work between 
1992 and 1996.  Estimated losses from these fires equaled ninety 
million-dollar. Liquid petroleum gas blowlamps and acetylene cutting 
equipment were the most common devices involved in all serious hot 
work fires.   Today, guidelines concerning hot work emphasize the role of 
human intervention in making hot work safer. They require frequent 
training for all staff members who perform hot work. Additionally, a 
person not performing the actual hot work maintains a continuous fire 
watch during the procedure as well as 1 hour after the work has been 
finished. At the North Sea area petroleum and petrochemical companies 
have successfully controlled fire/explosion related accidents since they 
have implemented more accountability on the equipment and hot work 
permits. A checklist for effective hot work practices, a strict written permit 
system, and training outline the mandatory requirements for all hot work 
operations (International tanker owner pollution federation Ltd, 2000).  
 
  
The following sections of this chapter compile valuable information about 
human errors, the close relationship between human performance levels and 
human errors, and methods of investigating human errors. 
 
Human Errors 
Definition 
Kirwan (1994) writes that “human errors are a natural by-product of 
human behavior” (p. 87). 
Another definition states that “human error is the failure of a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities” (Reason, 1990. p. 9). 
Just 60 years ago, scientists and psychologists hardly ever had 
considered human errors profoundly, or even systematically. 
Today, the most obvious impetus for this interest has been a growing 
public concern over the terrible cost of human errors. Events such as the 
Tenerife Runway Collision in 1977, Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate in 1984, the 
Challenger and Chernobyl in 1986, the King’s Cross tube station fire in 1987, 
and the Piper Alpha Oil Platform explosion in 1988, are some of the most 
relevant tragic episodes in human history (Westurm, 1989). In the past, the 
injurious consequences were usually confined to the immediate vicinity of the 
disaster. Now the nature and the scale of certain potentially hazardous 
  
technologies mean that human errors can have adverse effects upon a whole 
continent and over several generations (Reason, 1990). 
Types of Human Errors 
Human error is a very large subject, quite as extensive as that covered 
by the term of human performance. However, the topic can be categorized by 
using the many well-documented error types.  
Basically, errors can only be meaningfully applied to planned actions that 
fail during the process of achieving the desired outcome. Consequently, two 
basic human error types have been identified by Reason (1990): 
 
• Slips and/or lapses, where the actions don’t go according to the plan, 
and  
• Mistakes, where the plan itself is inadequate to achieve its objectives. 
 
Human Errors and Performance Levels  
Human errors can be categorized according to the performance levels at 
which they occur (Rasmussen, 1983).  Rasmussen classification wraps the two 
human error types into three possible basic levels of human performance: 1) 
skill, 2) rule, and 3) knowledge. (Levels shown in figure 2). 
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In order to better relate the connection between human errors and 
human performance levels, it is important to understand that each level has its 
own characteristics. According to Rasmussen (1983), the descriptions are: 
• #1 Skill-Based is the ability to carry out a task. It refers to actions that 
are automatic and easy due to an acquired skill. They usually happen 
quickly and without express effort on the part of the actor or person 
performing the actions. All actions may become automatic, 
unconscious actions that actors don't need to explicitly "think about" 
in order to accomplish. In this level, most training is concerned with 
skill development and its goal is the development of an automatic 
process. Typically, people need to understand how to execute a set 
of instructions, but they do not necessarily need to understand the 
Figure 2. 
  
reasons behind them. Through training, they will become proficient 
enough to perform the actions. 
• #2 Rule- Based is when the actor needs to fall back upon a set of 
explicit instructions or rules at his disposal. Rule-based action plays 
when an automatic skill fails. It involves matching the procedure and 
the problem currently facing the actor. These rules are typically of the 
"if X then Y" variety, and based on past experience and explicit 
instructions. To pursue the training analogy mentioned above, the 
person examines and interprets the situation, and chooses a rule that 
can best solve the problem. It is the first step to becoming a 
conscious actor. 
• #3 Knowledge-Based is when someone is faced with unfamiliar 
situations, or where low-level rules aren't appropriate. If rule-based 
processing doesn't solve the problem, the actor falls on knowledge-
based processing. For example, in the situations of establishing an 
emergency diagnosis, making strategic decisions, and/or solving a 
problem. Knowledge-based processing is a conscious process. It 
refers to what we typically think of as ”analytic thought.” 
A description of the interaction among the three human performance 
levels is known as the Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS). The system 
  
outlines the dynamic of these three levels. The description is based on 
information provided by Leape (1994). (figure 3). 
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Thus, committing an error can be not only related with the actor’s level of 
performance, but also with the interaction among the levels, depending on the 
consciousness that he or she has during the operation (figure 4). 
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Human Errors, Performance Levels and Failure Modes 
Before beginning any analysis to relate human errors, performance 
levels, and failure modes, it is important to do some preliminary prep work 
defining what “failure” means.  
It is possible to get 100 different definitions; however, it would make the 
analysis far too broad. Focusing not on everything, but on the things that are 
most important to the research, the definitions presented by Kenneth C. Latino 
at the National Petroleum Refineries Association (NPRA) Maintenance 
Conference in May 1996 are the most appropriate since this paper is absolutely 
related to the petroleum industry. Thus, failure is: 
• Any loss that interrupts the continuity of production. 
• A loss of asset availability.  
• The unavailability of equipment.  
• A deviation from the status quo.  
• Not meeting target expectations. 
• Any secondary defect.     
Hence, the term “failure mode,” for the purpose of this research, is 
defined as “any loss that interrupts the continuity of production” (Latino, 1996) 
since it focuses on the primary issues. 
  
Consequently, the failure modes at each of the three performance levels 
have been studied to identify error types before and/or after incidents occur 
(Reason, 1990). These modes are described in the following sections:  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. First, the skill-based performance: 
Failure Modes Description 
  
Double-capture 
slips 
Internal preoccupation / external 
distractors limit the attention. 
Omissions 
following 
interruptions 
External distractors limit the 
attention. 
Reduced 
intentionality 
A delay between the formulation 
of the tasks to be performed and 
the execution of the activities; 
generates failure of prospective 
memory (lapses). 
Perceptual 
confusions 
When the human recognition 
schema accepts as a match for 
the proper object something that 
looks like it. 
 
Inattention 
Interference 
errors 
When two current activity plans 
become entangled, affecting 
each other. 
  
Omissions Omission of some necessary steps. 
Repetitions 
When the actor decides that he 
has not reached the goal where 
actually he is; then he repeats 
the actions already done.  Overattention 
Reversals 
An inappropriately timed check 
can cause an action sequence to 
double back on itself (reversal). 
 
 
Table 4. Second, the rule-based performance: 
Failure Modes Description 
  
First exceptions 
Individual encounters a 
significant exception to a general 
rule after making a mistake. 
 Countersigns and 
nonsigns 
Individual establishes a wrong 
exception to an applicable 
general rule. 
 Informational 
overload 
Abundance of good information 
limits the adequate problem-
solving process. 
 
Misapplication 
of good rules 
Rule strength 
Because of its great success in 
the past, a strong rule is used 
although its matching conditions 
(requirements) are less than 
perfect. 
  
General Rules 
Because general rules are likely 
to be stronger and applicable to a 
high level of rule, here is a 
misapplication of a strong rule in 
a low-level of rule requiring it. 
 
Rigidity 
The lack of flexibility becomes a 
barrier to application of a good 
rule never used before. 
Encoding 
deficiencies 
Matching conditions of a 
particular situation are 
misrepresented; an inappropriate 
rule is then applied. Application of 
bad rules 
 
Action 
deficiencies 
(Wrong rules, 
Inelegant rules, 
Inadvisable rules) 
The action generates unsuitable, 
inelegant or inadvisable 
responses. 
 
Table 5. Third, the knowledge-based performance: 
Failure Modes Description 
  
Selectivity Mistakes will occur if attention is given to a wrong feature condition. 
Workspace limitations Improper space to perform a task. 
Out of sight / 
Out of mind Ignoring what is not presented. 
Overconfidence 
The problem solver is likely to be 
overconfident in evaluating the 
correctness of his/her knowledge. 
  
Biased reviewing 
The individual is likely to review 
his/her planned courses of actions 
at some time prior. Based on this, 
he/she assumes that all possible 
factors have been taken account. 
Illusory correlation 
The problem solver is poor at 
detecting many types of co-
variation. 
Problems with casualty 
The problem solver tends to 
underestimate the irregularities of 
the future because they are guided 
primarily by the stored recurrences 
of the past. As consequence, they 
will plan for fewer contingencies 
than will actually occur. 
  
 Once human errors have been classified into workable categories, it is 
necessary to explore the most frequent techniques for their effective 
investigation.  This is summarized in the following section. 
Methods of Investigating Human Errors 
Rizzo, Bagnara, & Visciola (1986) listed the following as the most useful 
methods of investigating human errors: 
• The naturalistic study identifies and describes naturally occurring 
phenomena based on its observation. 
• The questionnaire study documents everyday human conditions and 
performance through self-reports and questionnaires.  
• The laboratory study examines mechanisms through the deliberate 
elicitation of particular error types under controlled laboratory conditions.  
• The simulator study uses computer-based software to create many of 
the dynamic features of real-life and complex decision-making tasks.  
• The case study assesses a single case that can yield valuable 
information about the circumstances leading up to catastrophic errors. 
To properly identify possible human errors in the XYZ petroleum 
terminal, two techniques may be applicable. They are: 1) A case study and, 2) 
a questionnaire. However, a case study is not available; therefore, a 
questionnaire research tool documenting the combination of efforts presented 
by Reason, Rasmussen and Leape, previously described in this chapter, will be 
designed.  
In summary, chapter II presents a very extensive literature review 
regarding aspects such as ship-tankers and oil transportation, tanker’s cargo 
  
loading/unloading operations, worldwide oil tanker fire/explosion cases, and 
tanker-terminal operator errors; all of them related to fires and explosions. The 
above information is used as bases to identify possible operator errors in 
terminal XYZ. Chapter IV presents the questions and their results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
METHODOLOGY: IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN ERROR AT TERMINAL 
XYZ 
(FIRES/EXPLOSIONS) 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the procedures used to conduct 
this research for the identification of possible human errors regarding 
fires/explosions during loading/unloading operations at the XYZ marine 
petroleum terminal. 
Procedure 
I. In general, research available information for the better understanding of 
operations within the tanker/terminal interface. 
1. Marine oil transportation 
2. Tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations 
3. Fires/explosions 
4. Fire protection existing technologies 
5. Fire prevention and risk control guidelines 
6. Major losses because of fires/explosions  
II. Research available literature regarding the subject of human errors  
1. Definitions and types. 
2. Human errors and human performance levels  
  
3. Human performance levels and their failures modes  
4. Methods of investigation 
III. Research worldwide experiences regarding back issues  
1. Human errors that have resulted in fires/explosions in the tanker-
terminal interface during cargo loading/unloading operations. 
2. Identify possible human errors that can result in fires/explosions 
during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at the XYZ 
marine petroleum terminal 
3. Outlines major observations from the field visit to the XYZ 
terminal  
IV. Develop a questionnaire-survey (see appendix I) based on: 
1. Real operational conditions in the terminal 
2. Critical activities that in the past have resulted in fires/explosion 
because of human errors 
3. Identification of typical human errors focused on human 
performance levels and their modes of failures 
4. Existing fire prevention and risk control guidelines 
5. The company-operators fire/explosion loss prevention culture.  
V. Interpret data-results 
  
1. Survey: observations-questionnaire applied to the XYZ terminal 
operators 
2. Risk control solutions 
VI. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
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Chapter IV 
  
THE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter four is the analysis of collected data gathered from a 
questionnaire-survey specifically designed to identify “possible human errors” 
directly related with fires/explosions” among operators at the XYZ petroleum 
terminal. Twenty questionnaire-surveys were sent to the terminal and ten of 
them returned with answers. Consequently, a secondary study was needed in 
order to support and verify the results previously mentioned above. This section 
summarizes some of the most relevant worldwide human-error experiences 
that have resulted in fires/explosions during tankers´cargo loading/unloading 
operations within the petroleum industry. Successful risk control solutions are 
also presented. 
The Questionnaire 
A survey-questionnaire was prepared for the qualitative part of this 
research paper. Its aim is the identification of possible human errors that result 
in fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at the 
marine petroleum terminal XYZ. Since the collected information is expected to 
be confidential, none one was identified by name and/or other type of 
identification system. Appendix I lists the survey questions themselves.  
Ten out of twenty tanker-terminal operators were the sample subjects of 
the survey conducted by the safety director at the terminal in December 2000. 
  
Because the collected data was limited to 50% of the operator population; a 
secondary study complements and verifies the results and the analysis 
generated in this research.  
Moreover, the survey-questions were designed based on relevant 
information collected in the literature review, chapter II. They describe real 
operational conditions in the terminal and test the most important aspects for 
the identification of typical human errors and their relation with the company-
operators fire/explosion loss prevention culture. In general, three types of 
human performance levels were identified in chapter II, so their modes of failure 
are used as an identification tool to prove whether or not the existence of 
potential human errors that can result in fire/explosion accidents among the 
tanker-terminal operators subject matter of this study. In other words, questions 
were formulated following the descriptions that characterize the way every level 
of human performance fails (see table 6, next page). In addition, the survey 
focus in critical activities that in the past have resulted in fire/explosion losses 
because of human errors in marine petroleum terminal around the world.   
The final collected results are discussed in the following section, and 
used in chapter V to outline risk control solutions and recommendations to 
minimize losses. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Identification of possible human error: Questionnaire-Survey 
Question Description 
1 General question: fires/explosions and errors factors 
2 General question: human errors 
3 General question: human errors in loading operations 
4 General question: human errors in unloading operations 
5 General question: past experience dealing with fires/explosions (1) 
6 General question: past experience dealing with fires/explosions (2) 
7 Skill based performance: failure mode: Inattention 
1. Double-capture slips 
2. Omissions following interruptions  
8 Skill based performance: failure mode: Overattention 
3. Omissions 
9 Skill based performance: failure mode: Overattention 
  
4. Omissions 
10 Skill based performance: failure mode: Inattention 
5. Perceptual confusions 
11 Skill based performance: failure mode: Inattention 
• Perceptual confusions 
12 Knowledge based performance: Biased reviewed 
13 Knowledge based performance: Biased reviewed 
13.1 Knowledge based performance: Workplace limitation 
14 Skill based performance: failure mode: Inattention 
6. Reduced intentionality 
15 Rule based performance: Application of bad rules 
• Action deficiencies 
16 Knowledge based performance: Selectivity 
17 Rule based performance: Application of bad rules 
• Encoding deficiencies 
18 Rule based performance: Application of bad rules 
• Action deficiencies 
19 Rule based performance: Misapplication of good information 
• Informational overload 
20 Rule based performance: Misapplication of good information 
• Informational overload 
21 General question: asking suggestions to decrease human errors 
22 Knowledge based performance: Out of sight/out of mind 
23 Knowledge based performance: Overconfidence 
24 General question: asking about relevant training 
                    Legend 
 General questions 
 Skill based questions 
 Rule based questions 
 Knowledge based questions 
  
Questionnaire Results 
The following questions were asked and the results are reported below: 
XYZ Terminal Operators Information (participants) 
Table 7, Operators’ job position and age 
Title Quantity / percentage 
Terminal operator 
(day shift) 5 / 50% 
Terminal operator 
(night shift) 5 / 50% 
Age Quantity / percentage 
25-30 6 / 60% 
30-35 3 / 30% 
35-40 1 / 10% 
 
Note: terminal operators are in charge of loading/unloading operations and maintenance activities. They are set in-
group of 5 operators, and one of them is the team leader. There are 4 groups working in two different shifts. Shift #1 
is from 7am to 7pm, and shift #2 is from 7pm to 7am. The teams work continually during 4 days. Then, the teams 
that have worked in the day shift must switch to the night shift after 4 off days. Basically, It happens every 8 days. 
Table 8, Operators’ experience and educational background 
Years of experience Quantity / percentage 
< 3 months 1 / 10% 
< 1 yr 2 / 20% 
< 3 yrs 5 / 50% 
< 5 yrs 1 / 10% 
< 10 yrs 1 / 10% 
> 10 yrs 0 / 0% 
Educational background Quantity / percentage 
Mechanics 4 / 40% 
Marine 2 / 20% 
Certified professional welder 1 / 10% 
Technical college (no completed) 3 / 30% 
Note: data collected shows that 70% of the operators have a work experience longer than 3 years. In addition, seven 
out of ten operators, have an educational background related to typical operations at the terminal. Only three 
operators have not completed studies in the technical college. 
Table 9, Terminal-working conditions (noise, temperature, illumination): 
Noisy  
Yes 20% 
  
No 80% 
Temperature  
Hot 100%
Cold 0% 
Illumination  
Poor 66.6%
Good 33.3%
Note: Terminal-working conditions such as temperature and illumination seem to be the mayor areas for improvement 
1).- Based on your experience dealing with fires or explosions in the 
terminal, what is the probability that a fire or explosion can be attributed to the 
following factors?: (Check all the possible answers) 
 
Answers: 
 
1.- Human errors 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0% 0% 10% 70% 20% 
2.- Company organizational factors 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 90% 10%  0%  0%  0% 
3.- Environmental factors (weather conditions) 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100% 0%  0%  0%  0% 
4.- Hardware system 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100% 0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
5.- Pipeline system 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100% 0%  0%  0%  0% 
6.- Pump system 
  
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 70% 30%  0%  0%   0% 
7.- Operational procedures 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100% 0%  0%   0%  0% 
8.- Inert gas system 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%   0%   0%   0% 
9.- Venting system 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 90% 10%  0%  0%  0% 
10.- Valve failure 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 90% 10%  0%  0%   0% 
11.- Static electricity as source of ignition 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 10% 70%  20%  0%   0% 
 
 Results collected in question #1 prove that human error is the number 
one reason of fire/explosion accidental losses in the terminal followed by the 
presence of static electricity as source of ignition.  
2).- If human error is one of your answers in the previous question, what 
is the probability that it is due to: 
 
 
Answers 
1.- Ignorance 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
  
Answer 10% 10% 80%  0%  0% 
2.- Communication 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 10%  0%  10%  80%  0% 
3.- Preparation  
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 80% 10%  10%  0%  0% 
4.- Judgment 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 90% 10%  0%  0%  0% 
5.- Training 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 50% 50%  0%  0%  0% 
6.- Violations 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  0%  0%   10%   90% 
 
Violations of company rules and standards, lack of communication and 
operator’s ignorance are the most relevant factors that put in risk the operations 
in the terminal-tanker interface.  
3).- Based on your experience, assess in term of fire/explosion accident 
caused by human errors the level of risk for each of the steps in a typical 
loading operation?             Answers 
1.- Vessel arrival 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
2.- Hook up 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  0%   90%  10%  0% 
  
3.- Start up  
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  10%  90%  0%  0% 
4.- Steady - rate 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
5.- Topping off 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
6.- Disconnect 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  90%  10%   0%   0% 
7.- Departure 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%   0%   0% 
Operations such as hook-up, start-up, and disconnect seem to be the 
most critical in term of fire/explosion prevention. Specific measures must be 
taken to minimize potential losses. 
4).- Based on your experience, assess in term of fire/explosion accident 
caused by human errors the level of risk for each of the steps in a typical 
unloading operation?        Answers 
1.- Vessel arrival 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
2.- Hook up 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%   0%   0%  0% 
  
3.- Start up  
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%   0%  10%  90%  0% 
4.- Steady - rate 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  50%  50%  0%  0% 
5.- Topping off 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
6.- Disconnect 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 0%   0%   50%   50%   0% 
7.- Departure 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answer 100%  0%  0%   0%   0% 
 Data collected shows similar trends between loading operations and 
unloading operations. Again, activities such as start-up, and disconnect, affect 
the risk-free conditions while tanker’s cargoes is unloaded. 
5).- Have you ever dealt with fires or explosions during loading or unloading 
operations in the terminal? 
 
  Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 60% 10% 20% 10% 0% 
 
  
6).- If yes, mention one case that you remember because of its 
significance 
 No answers. The question was not used since the terminal supervisor 
did not give the approval for its application. 
7).- The following is a hypothetic work situation at the terminal.  
You just have a limited period of time to complete maintenance work on 
pump #1 before your shift ends in the afternoon. This pump handles an 
important flow volume from the tanker to the terminal storage area. Suddenly, 
your direct supervisor calls you by radio. He asks you to complete the 
remaining tasks before the next tanker hooks up to the terminal piping system. 
You just remember your doctor appointment scheduled after work. The 
following are some of the possible remaining tanks to complete: 
TASKS Time 
1.- Pick up pump spare parts at the terminal 
warehouse 15 min 
2.- welding work 15 min 
3.- Get approval for hot work 20 min 
4.- Assembling pump parts 30 min 
5.- Pump post-testing 20 min 
6.- Call your doctor to move the appointment 2 hours 
later Unknown 
 
What plan would you most likely follow to take care of your responsibilities and 
be on time with the operation’ schedule? (Check one) 
                                 Answers (“C” is correct answer) 
 
  
 Quantity Percentage 
(A) 1+2+3+4+5+6 4 40% 
(B) 1+6+2+3+4+5 3 30% 
(C) 1+6+3+2+4+5 2 30% 
Question #7 was designed to measure external/internal distractors (ex. 
In this case a radio call, and a doctor appointment), limiting operator’s attention 
while performing their job. The results prove that 70% mistook providing the 
correct answer. 
8).- Do you remember any time that, while performing your job, you have 
omitted or forgotten a step or procedure knowing perfectly that it was one of the 
requirement of your task?  
                                                       Answers 
 Quantity Percentage 
Yes 3 30% 
No 7 70% 
9).- If yes, how often 
 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 70% 20% 10% 0% 0% 
Results from questions #8 and #9 indicate that operators rarely omit or 
forget required procedures. However, 30% admitted no to strictly follow rules. 
 
10).- Do you consider that your job is highly routinized on the same set of 
actions every day?                                    Answers 
 Quantity Percentage 
Yes 7 70% 
  
No 3 30% 
Data collected displays that 70% of the answers converge in the same 
opinions: “operator’s job is highly routinized.” Moreover, question 11 below 
indicates that only 57% of the answers assure that operators wouldn’t use 
wrongly a valve while performing the everyday work.   
 
11).- If yes, how often have you wrongly opened or closed a valve that looks 
similar to the right one? 
 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 57% 21.5% 21.5% 0% 0% 
 
12).- An inspection using a safety checklist is designed to review safety 
conditions in general. Additional observations can enforce the effectiveness of 
the inspection.  How often do you limit the inspection just to the items on the 
checklist? (Check one)  
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 0% 10% 20% 20% 50% 
13).- In your opinion, does the checklist cover all the safety aspects 
involved in the operations?                    
                                                Answer 
 Quantity Percentage 
Yes 6 60% 
  
No 3 30% 
I don’t know 1 10% 
Questions #12 and  #13 attempt to evaluate how effective the existing 
checklist system covers safety aspects involved in the operations while 
loading/unloading tanker’s cargoes at the terminal. Results from question #12 
indicate that all operators limit their inspections just to the items on the 
checklist. Nevertheless, question #13 indicates that only 30% believe that 
existing checklist doesn’t cover every possible hazardous condition.  
 
“Whenever volatile petroleum products are being loaded, all doors, portholes 
and openings leading from the main deck to accommodation or machinery 
spaces are required to be kept shut; although modern tank vessels have been 
modified for vapor control operations”. The above statement is: 
(True is the correct answer). 
 Answers (percentage) 
 
 
The aim of question #13 is to evaluate whether or not operators know the 
rules. 70% correctly answered the question.  
14).- A tanker is already hooked up to the loading arm, and you have 
been told to fill one of the cargo tanks on board with inert gas before the 
terminal oil-pumping system starts the transfer of product. Suddenly, at the 
True (70%) False (30%)  
  
middle of the inert gas setting process, someone calls you by radio regarding 
information about the status of the operation. How often does the below 
statement become true in your everyday job? 
“A interruption, for example a radio call, will likely affect the continuous 
performance of the required tasks and their logical sequence”. 
                             Answers 
 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 0% 70% 30% 0% 0% 
 
This question measures the probability that an external agent, such as a 
radio call, can modify or affect the logical sequence of the operation. All 
answers converge upon the same opinion. External factors may affect 
performance’s outputs.  
15).- Are fire extinguishers required to be around the manifold area 
during loading/unloading operations? (The correct answer is “yes”) 
 
 
                                                           Answers 
 Quantity Percentage 
Yes 7 70% 
No 3 30% 
 
  
The aim of question #15 is to evaluate whether or not operators know the 
rules. 70% correctly answered the question. 
16).- What is the required oxygen concentration level in an inerted cargo 
tank?                           
                                  Answers (“Below 8% is the correct answer”) 
 Above 
21% 
 About  
21% 
 Just 
18% 
 Below 8%  
Answers 10%  10%  40%  40%  
The aim of question #16 is to evaluate whether or not operators know the 
rules. Only 40% correctly answered the question (“Below 8%”). 
17).- List 4 typical required conditions to carry out a hot work in hazardous 
areas 
According to the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals 
(1988), a complete answer for this question would be: 
 
• Fire fighting equipment must be ready for immediate use. 
• Gas free certificate must be issued. 
• Portable continuous gas detector must keep monitoring the atmosphere 
in the working area. 
• Work area must be clear of any combustible material 
  
The collected answers were: 
 
• 100% answered “fire extinguisher” 
• 100% answered “gas free certificate” 
• 40% answered “gas detector for monitoring” 
• No one mentioned that “work area must be clear of any combustible 
material” 
  
Operators didn’t prove to know the expectations and requirements to 
carry out hot work. The use of gas detector for monitoring the atmosphere while 
performing a hot work is critical among this group of operators.  
18).- Did you know that gaskets and seals in good conditions at the 
flange face in the tanker manifold are important to prevent fires during 
loading/unloading operations? 
                        Answers (percentage) 
 
30% of the operator’s answers didn’t prove knowledge about the 
importance of gaskets and seals in good conditions at the flange face in the 
tanker manifold (tanker-terminal connections). Since results from question #3 
tell that operations such as hook-up, start-up, and disconnect seem to be the 
most critical in term of fire/explosion precautionary actions, specific measures 
must be taken to minimize 
leakage, spill, and/or the presence of explosive atmospheres in the tanker-
terminal surroundings.  
19).- In your opinion, do available information, standards, and company 
rules provide you with enough information to prevent fires/explosions during 
loading/unloading operations?  
                              Answers (percentage) 
 
Yes (100%) No (0%) 
Yes (70%) No (30%) 
  
 
20).- In your opinion, does the abundance of information, standards, and 
company rules limit you in the adequate solving problem process?  
                                         Answers (percentage) 
 
90% says that abundance of information doesn’t limit the effectiveness 
of solving problem process. Standards and rules seem to be simple and easy to 
use. 
21).- If any, what changes would you suggest to decrease the chance of 
fire/explosion due to human errors during loading/unloading operations in the 
terminal? 
The answers were: 
 
• The company should provide more training sessions during the year (For 
example: one every three months). 
• Have fire/explosion demonstrations. 
• Review existing fire prevention procedures to make them easier for the 
daily usage. 
• Fire prevention training to review the most critical operations at the 
terminal. 
• Ensure perfect seal in pipes/hoses connections. 
• Use the required tools (no spark producing source) 
• Require better housekeeping onboard tankers. 
• Plan ahead activities at the terminal. Get their approvals. 
 
Yes (10%) No (90%)
  
22).- List situations that require maintenance of cargo tanks in non 
flammable conditions 
According to the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals 
(1988), a complete answer for this question would be: 
 
• Empty cargo tanks 
• Tanks while cargo is being unloaded 
• Tanks while deballasting 
• Tanks during crude oil washing and cleaning 
 
The collected answers were: 
 
• 40% answered “empty cargo tanks” 
• 100% answered “Tanks while cargo is being unloaded” 
• 30% answered “Tanks while deballasting” 
• 40% answered “Tanks during crude oil washing and cleaning” 
 
23).- How confident do you feel about the correctness of your answer in 
the previous question? (Check one below) 
 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answers 10% 60% 30% 0% 0% 
 
From the collected data in questions # 22, and #23, operators should be 
trained more about requirements for maintenance of cargo tanks in non-
flammable conditions. These results prove deficiencies in the operations and 
lack of knowledge. 
24).- Could you list some relevant training sessions in which you have 
participated specifically focused on fire/explosion prevention? 
  
Answers 
1 LP-gas fires/explosions 
2 Pipes connection failed-fires 
3 Hot work – welding and cutting operations (fire prevention) 
4 Fire/explosion protection and emergency plan 
5 Heat detectors 
6 Competency is key to responders' performance  (Fires in petroleum terminals) 
7 Use of multigas detectors 
8 Training programs' effectiveness questioned (Storage facility fire/ tank farm fire) 
9 Fuel line leak vapors and fire/explosions onboard tankers 
10 Spilled gasoline vapors ignited by pilot light 
11 Natural gas fires 
12 Fire/explosions in high pressure line leaks 
13 LP-gas fires and explosions 
14 Natural gas fires and explosions 
15 Natural disaster emergency response  
16 NFPA fire inspector certification program 
 
 Summary 
The past pages have displayed the questionnaire data, of which is 
explained initially, during its presentation. The following section analyzes the 
results, grouping the questions in three categories: skill based, rule based, and 
knowledge based. Finally, results generated are also compared against world 
industry errors. 
  
Questionnaire Analysis 
Table 10. Skill Based Questions (Results) 
 
Question 7 
Fault 70% No fault 30% 
 
Question 8 
Fault 30% No fault 70% 
 
Question 9 (frequency of failure for question 8) 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 70% 20% 10% 0% 0% 
 
Question 10 
70% said that his work is highly routinized. 30% said : “NO” 
 
Question 11 
Fault 43% No fault 57% 
 
 Note: Frequency of failure (question 11) 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 57% 21.5% 21.5% 0% 0% 
 
Question 14 
Fault 100% No fault 0% 
 
 Note: Frequency of failure (question 14) 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 0% 70% 30% 0% 0% 
 
(See appendix I to refer question listed in this table) 
 Data collected indicates that external distractors  (ex. a radio call) and 
internal preoccupations (ex. a doctor appointment) can highly limit operators’ 
attention (question 7). Only 30% of answers were right in question 7. Basically, 
operators mistook planning the sequence of tasks well; hot permit approval 
  
must happen before any welding operation takes place. In contrast, results from 
question 8 and 9 tell that operators would rarely omit or forget procedures. 
Moreover, 70% said that his work is highly routinized. Almost half of them, 43%, 
communicated that they might wrongly open or close a valve. Finally, question 
14 supports results from question 7. Interruptions can affect the continuous 
logical sequence of operator’s work. Overall, special attention should be paid to 
operators’ highly routinized work. External/internal distractors may be root 
errors in the operations. 
Table 11. Rule Based Questions (Results) 
Question 15 
Fault 30% No fault 70% 
 
Question 17 
The collected answers were: 
• 100% answered “fire extinguisher” 
• 100% answered “gas free certificate” 
• 40% answered “gas detector for monitoring” 
• No one mentioned that “work area must be clear of any combustible material” 
 
Question 18 
Fault 30% No fault 70% 
 
Question 19 
Rule based performance: Misapplication of good information.  
• Informational overload 
Answer: there is enough information such as standards and rules, to prevent 
fires/explosions during loading/unloading operations at the terminal. 
Question 20 
 
10% said that existing abundance of information limit the adequate solving problem 
process. 90% said: “NO 
(See appendix I to refer question listed in this table) 
  
Data collected indicates that 70% of operators recognized the 
requirement for having fire extinguishers around tankers’ manifold areas during 
loading/unloading operations. However, they partially know the required 
conditions to carry out hot work. Results from question 17 show that around 
half of operators would use gas detectors to keep monitoring atmosphere 
quality at the work area. Nevertheless, none one mentioned the importance of 
having good housekeeping to free work areas from combustible materials 
before performing any hot work. In addition, operators expressed that the 
company provides enough information such as standards and rules, to prevent 
fires/explosions during loading/unloading operations at the terminal; however 
10% said that existing abundance of information limit the adequate problem 
solving process. Overall, special attention should be paid to existing training for 
hot-work permit conformance since operator’s answers didn’t prove knowledge 
of the rule and its requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Knowledge Based Questions 
  
Question 12 
Fault 100% No fault 0% 
 
 Note: Frequency of failure (question 12) 
 Never 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
Answers 0% 10% 20% 20% 50% 
 
Question 13 
60% said that checklists cover all the safety aspects involved in the operations. 40% did 
not agree. 
 
Question 13.1 
Fault 30% No fault 70% 
 
Question 16 
Fault 60% No fault 40% 
 
Question 22 
 The collected answers were: 
 
• 40% answered “empty cargo tanks” 
• 100% answered “Tanks while cargo is being unloaded” 
• 30% answered “Tanks while deballasting” 
• 40% answered “Tanks during crude oil washing and cleaning” 
 
Question 23  
Complements question 22. 
This measures correctness versus “confidence” 
 
 Low 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
High 
(5) 
Answers 10% 60% 30% 0% 0% 
 
 
(See appendix I to refer question listed in this table) 
 Data collected indicates that 100% of operators assume that all possible 
factors have been taken into account when limiting inspections just to the items 
on the checklists. Nevertheless, 30% said that checklists don’t cover all the 
safety aspects involved in the operations (question 13).  
  
Feedback from question 16 is also very critical. Six out of 10 operators 
answered wrong. They didn’t know the required oxygen concentration, 8%, to 
keep tankers and terminals safe against fires. Moreover, about 30% to 40% of 
operators answered correctly question 22 regarding groups of situations that 
require maintenance of cargo tanks in non-flammable conditions. Even though, 
everyone knew that unloading operations require assuring non-flammable 
atmosphere. Results from question 23, tell operators don’t feel overconfident. 
They ranked their knowledge based on answers provided to question 22. All 
operators believed in their expertise, yet admitted no to provide a complete 
answer. 
Worldwide Human-Error Experiences  
The world industry experience among oil-terminal companies verifies the 
results gathered from the questionnaire-survey since potential issues detected 
among operators at the XYZ terminal seem to be the same and follow similar 
trends. Aspects such as inadequate safety inspections, jobs highly routinized, 
deficient hot work permit systems, and lack of knowledge about fire/explosion 
precautionary actions; still need to be considered as high priority by companies 
Table 13, page 86, presents alternative solutions that have been 
developed and implemented world-wide by oil-terminal companies to effectively 
control frequent problems regarding operators performance issues. This 
summarizes valuable information gathered in the literature review. 
  
Table 13. Worldwide Human-Errors and Fire/Explosion Experiences 
 
Identified issues 
(Tanker-terminal operator errors) 
Identified corrective actions 
(Some successful risk control solution) 
Process hazard analysis: a core component of the 
process safety management procedure 
implemented in refineries, terminals and storage 
facilities belonging to Citgo Petroleum  & Co. This 
includes a human factors analysis of working 
conditions that may adversely impact the safety 
performance of CITGO personnel and potentially 
produce accident event sequences, especially 
during startup, maintenance operations, and 
upset/emergency conditions  
Training: operators trained on: Process hazard 
analysis, effective communication of procedures, 
certification programs for tanker’s inspections, and 
fire/explosion precaution practices. 
Communication: a stronger terminal policy 
requirement for the provision of improved signing 
systems on board clients’ barges and tankers 
(Kurnell Marine Terminal, 2000). 
Behavior based safety: program focused almost 
entirely on modifying the behavior of terminal 
operators. Listing critical worker behavior, 
monitoring periodically operator’s work activities, 
training operators to perform correctly, and 
encouraging operators to care about each other 
safety, Chevron Co. has built safe work practices 
as a matter of habit at its L.A and N.J terminal 
facilities.   
Tanker/barge inspection systems: the Ship 
Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) and The 
Inspection Report Data-Sharing (IRDS) scheme 
were developed in the 1990s. With these systems, 
which are worldwide, tanker/barge inspections are 
carried out and reports issued in a consistent 
format. Thus, terminal operator’s crews can get 
prepared previous to the loading/unloading 
operations on a specific vessel. 
 
 
 
1. Usage of cigarette lighters in no smoking 
areas. 
 
2. Preparedness, and lack of experience to set 
adequately the inert gas system for 
flammable vapor control. 
 
3. Operators no following appropriated 
company procedures and fire safety 
precautions 
 
4. Operator lack of judgment on assessing 
good condition of gaskets and/or seals at the 
interface tanker manifold/terminal piping 
system. Consequently: 
 
• Ignition generated by friction in the 
flanged joint interface of tanker 
manifold/terminal piping system when 
hook up operation. 
 
• Fire fed by flammable vapors leakage. 
 
5. Tanker/terminal operator lack of 
communication. 
 
6. Terminal operators no familiar enough with 
tanker instrumentation, piping, and tanker 
layout. 
 
7. Operators non-compliance with existing risk 
control rules regarding “hot work permits” 
 
8. Fire set off by operators holding no-
approved solvents onboard tankers.  
 
9. Terminal inspectors lack assessing safety 
conditions onboard tankers (tanker 
inspections). 
Hot work permits: the European Petroleum Loss 
Prevention Council (UK) requires frequent training 
for all North Sea company staff members who 
perform hot work. Additionally, a person not 
performing the actual hot work maintains a 
continuous fire watch during the procedure as well 
as 1 hour after the work has been finished. 
Companies have implemented more accountability 
on equipment and permits. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to identify possible human errors that can 
result in fires/explosions during tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations at 
the XYZ marine petroleum terminal. The objectives of this study were to: (1) 
Identify possible types of human errors that can result in fires/explosions during 
tankers’ cargo loading/unloading operations; (2) Provide risk control solutions to 
the identified problems. 
Conclusions 
Human error types identified among operators at the XYZ terminal are: 
• Skill based performance level (inattention): 
Operators defined their job as a highly routinized condition. This situation 
could be cause for root errors since human recognition schema can accept 
as a match for the proper object something that looks like it. 
External distractors/ internal preoccupations can limit operators’ attention 
• Rule based performance level (encoding deficiencies): 
Operators didn’t completely know the rule’s requirements to carry out 
hot-work and to compliance with the permit. This situation could cause root 
  
errors since matching conditions of a particular situation are 
misrepresented. Then an inappropriate rule is applied.  
• Knowledge based performance level (Biased reviewing) 
100% of operators limited their inspections just to items on the checklist, 
although 30% said that these lists don’t cover all the safety aspects involved 
in the operation. This situation could cause root errors since the operator is 
likely to assume that all possible factors have been taken into account.   
• Knowledge based performance level (Selectivity) 
Mistakes will occur if attention is given to a wrong feature condition. 
When providing a list of possible values, 60% operators wrongly answered 
the oxygen concentration required to keep safe tankers and terminals 
against fires/explosions 
• Knowledge based performance level (Out of sight/out of mind) 
Ignoring what is not present. 60% - 70% of operators incompletely 
answered group of situations that require maintenance of cargo tanks in 
non-flammable conditions. This could cause root errors since operators 
ignore part of the group of situations required. 
 The goal of introducing risk controls for the identified behavioral errors is 
presented in table 14 
 
  
Table 14. Risk Control Solutions to identified problems: 
Identified issue Risk control solution 
Operators’ job as a highly routinized 
condition 
• Plan ahead activities and follow 
them using a checklist system. 
• Rotate operators to different shift 
and job positions. 
External distractors/ internal 
preoccupations limit operators’ 
attention 
• Limit the use of radios. 
• Operators should always follow the 
activities checklist. 
Operators are lacking about 
requirements to carry out hot-work 
• Provide more training to educate 
operators about standard 
operational procedures 
• Implement more accountability on 
equipment and permits. 
Operators limit inspections just to 
items on the checklist. These lists 
don’t always cover all the safety 
aspects involved in the operations 
• XYZ terminal could become 
member of the OCIMF report data 
system for tankers/barges 
inspections. 
• Implementation of process hazard 
analysis (P.H.A) for activities that 
have the potential to generate 
fires/explosions 
 
 
Table 14. Risk Control Solutions to identified problems (continue): 
Identified issue Risk control solution 
  
Operators lacking knowledge about 
oxygen concentrations required to 
keep tankers and terminals safe 
against fires/explosions 
Ignoring part of the group of situations 
required to maintain cargo tanks in 
non-flammable conditions 
• Provide more training to educate 
operators about standard 
operational procedures 
• Enforce operator’s knowledge on 
fire/explosion safety rules 
 
Recommendations 
The following are recommendations for actions by terminal XYZ: 
1.- Terminal XYZ should start implementation of risk controls presented above 
as soon as possible since conformance costs are much less than potential 
loss from fires/explosions. 
2.- Terminal XYZ must focus training on specific issues listed in the 
conclusions. 
3.- In order to be more appropriate, future study is recommended to involving 
a larger number of terminal operators. 
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